Atty. Ensign M. Icamen

Author: Atty. Ensign Icamen

Actions for Recovery of Possession of Real Property

August 8, 2022

These are the three ways to recover possession of real property under the Philippine law and legal system

The legal actions for recovery of possession of real property may be any of the following:

1. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahucio). In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth, whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession, while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

2. Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.

3. Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and awards the possession of the property to the lawful owner. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.[1]

On the other hand, we have the so-called action for Quieting of Title, which is a “common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.” In such an action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants to place things in their proper place and to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (b) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

“The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.” [2]

[1] You may read the case of Heirs of Alfonso Yusingco, Represented by Teodoro K. Yusingco vs. Amelita Busilak, et.al., G.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018
[2] Heirs of Margarita Prodon vs. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, G.R. No. 170604, September 02, 2013

June 25, 2025
Mga Pamatay na Pangako Ever Made
August 8, 2022

These are the top most grandiose, if not most irritating, promises made by Filipino politicians I have heard.
1. President Joseph Estrada – “Ngayon pa lamang, ang mga kamag anak ko ay nilalapitan na ng kung sinu-sino. Kung anu-anong deal at kickback ang pinapangako. Binabalaan ko sila. Walang kaibigan, walang kumpare, walang kamag-anak o anak na maaring mag samantala sa ngayon. At ngayon pa lang sinasabi ko sa inyo, nag aaksaya lamang kayo ng panahon. Huwag ninyo akong subukan.” Unfortunately, Erap was kicked out of the presidency because of corruption and on allegations of favoring his friends and families.
2. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino – “At pag hindi ho nangyari ito, nandyan ho si Secretary Abaya na nangangasiwa ng proyektong ito, dalawa na kaming magpapasagasa siguro sa train.” In this instance Pres. Aquino declared that if the LRT project missed the 2015 deadline, he was ready to be run over by a train. The train project did not happen but Aquino died of illness and not because he was run over by a train.
3. President Rodrigo R. Duterte – “If elected president, give me about three to six months, I will get rid of corruption, drugs and criminality.” Pres. Duterte’s term ended on 30 June 2022 but the drug problem and criminality are still rampant.
4. Senator Alan Peter Cayetano – This is the “Sampung Libong Pag Asa” program promise of Cayetano which was designed to give 10 thousand pesos to select beneficiary to alleviate the effects of COVID pandemic. As a congressman of the 18th Congress (2019-2022), he actually filed a bill for this but it never ripened into law. Still this is such an ostentatious promise which should have not been vocalized to citizens who are still waiting for such promise until now. Sen. Cayetano promised to file a similar bill in the 19th Congress (2022-2025) of which he is a member as a senator who had just received a 6-year fresh electoral mandate in the just concluded elections (2022 National Elections).
5. President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. – One of the promises of Pres. Marcos, Jr. in election campaign speeches was to lower the price of rice (Philippines’ primary staple food) to as low as Php20.00 per kilo. He formally assumed presidency on 30th of June 2022, and many Filipinos, including myself, are waiting for this to happen. Many doubts the realization of this promise. We will see.
June 25, 2025
Collusion and Grave Misconduct by Public Officers and Employees

October 1, 2021

Grave misconduct committed by a public officer that will warrant his/her dismissal from the service must not be a mere failure to comply with the law. Also, an allegation of collusion must be proved by clear and convincing evidence to justify removal of a public officer from service.

The case of Jaspe, Noel T. and Araneta, Ma. Negenia vs. Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office and Agustin Sonza G.R. No. 251940, July 12, 2021 grave misconduct that may warrant dismissal of a public officer was defined as follows:

“Grave misconduct is defined as the “wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.” It is not mere failure to comply with the law. Failure to comply must be deliberate and must be done in order to secure benefits for the offender or for some other person.”

“For a charge of grave misconduct or any grave offense to prosper, therefore, the evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge. Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions, as in this case, warrants the dismissal of the charge.”

Likewise in the same case, it was pronounced that to warrant a dismissal of a public officer or employee from the service based on collusion with parties in a public bidding, the person charging collusion must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that:

“On this score, Desierto v. Ocampo pronounced that the complainant charging collusion must prove it by clear-and convincing evidence, thus:

“Collusion implies a secret understanding whereby one party plays into another’s hands for fraudulent purposes. It may take place between and every contractor resulting in no competition, in which case, the government may declare a failure of bidding. Collusion may also ensue between contractors and the chairman and members of the PBAC to simulate or rig the bidding process, thus insuring the award to a favored bidder, to the-prejudice of the government agency and public service. For such acts of the chairman and the members of the PBAC, they may be held administratively liable for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the government service. Collusion by and among the members of the PBAC and/or contractors submitting their bids may be determined from their collective acts or omissions before, during and after the bidding process. The complainants are burdened to prove such collusion by clear and convincing evidence because if so proved, the responsible officials may be dismissed from the government service or meted severe administrative sanctions for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the government service.”

Further, Desierto ordained that mere declaration of a lone winning bidder does not necessarily mean there was collusion, absent a showing that the BAC members were closely associated with the bidders, thus:

“We believe that in this case, the complainants failed to prove that there was collusion by and among the contractors and the chairman and members of the PBAC. The PBAC may have erred in waiving the defects in the bids of Carwin Construction and Ed-Mar’s Construction on the belief that the defects were minor, but it does not follow that its members, including the respondent, conspired with the contractors to rig the bid process. Carwin Construction and Ed-Mar’s Construction may have, likewise, submitted defective bid documents but, absent any other evidence, it cannot thereby be concluded that there was conspiracy to rig the bid process to insure that PR T Construction would emerge the lone and winning bidder. The chairman and members of the PBAC may have, likewise, erred in the performance of their duties, but it does not necessarily mean that they did so in bad faith or with dishonesty.”

June 25, 2025
Other Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage
Psychological incapacity is actually the most difficult to prove as a ground in petitions for annulment of marriage. Although most difficult, this is most frequently use by lawyers and petitioners. Probably, the petitioner just want to get out of the marriage although he/she has no grounds at all, and because there is no divorce in the Philippines, they have no other alternative but utilize psychological incapacity.

Because there is no divorce in the Philippines, lawyers of couples (husbands or wives) who want to end their marriages frequently use Article 36 of the Family Code in seeking annulment of marriage. This is the provision on psychological incapacity. This ground for annulment of marriage is the most difficult ground to prove. If the lawyer in the Office of the Solicitor General who is assigned to the case relentlessly pursues the case up to the Supreme Court, it is more likely that a petition for annulment of marriages will be denied. The statistics of annulment cases grounded on psychological incapacity and decided by the Supreme Court would tell us that almost always the Supreme Court upheld the preservation of marriage. Psychological incapacity is very difficult to prove (especially when a case reaches the Supreme Court) considering that the law has no definite definition as to what psychological incapacity is. The entire Family Code did not even set parameters which may guide lawyers and parties as to the existence of psychological incapacity on the part of either spouse.

There is only a jurisprudence to consult to guide lawyers in deciding whether psychological incapacity exists and that his/her client has a cause of action. Here is one jurisprudential definition of psychological incapacity in the case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 quoting another case:

“Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”

It what further stated in that case that, “psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision “with less specificity than expected” in order to have the law “allow some resiliency in its application. Illustrative of the “less specificity than expected” has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.”

The Family Code provides other grounds for dissolution of marriage. If these grounds exist and supported by evidence, not just testimonial, the marriage will almost certainly be decreed annulled.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, the following marriages shall be void from the very beginning:
1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by preceding Chapter (referring to Articles 27 to 34 of the Family Code);
4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages under Article 41;
5. Those contracted through mistake of one of the contracting party as to the identity of the other; and,
6. Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Under Article 37 of the Family Code, the following marriages are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Under Article 38 of the Family code the following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code the marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had the well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.

Article 45 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be annulled for the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
1. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty one, and the marriage was solemnized without consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
2. That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
3. That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
4. That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or cease, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
5. That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
6. That either party was afflicted with sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
Legal References

Executive Order No. 209, s. 1987 (Family Code of the Philippines)

G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
June 25, 2025
Taxes on Sale of Shares of Stock

July 26, 2022

BIR rules and regulations on taxes for sale of shares of stock

Relevant BIR rules and regulations relevant to taxes impose on the transfer or sale of corporation’s shares traded or not traded thru local stock exchange.

1. Revenue Regulation 6-2008

2. Revenue Memorandum Circular 37-2012

3. Revenue Regulation 6-2013

4. Revenue Memorandum Order 15-2003

June 25, 2025
Notary Public’s Notarial Seal

April 15, 2021

A notary public should at, all times, safeguard his notarial seal. If somebody uses the notarial seal for any illegal act, the concerned notary public may be held administratively liable despite him/her having no knowledge of such illegal act.

In a very recent case, a lawyer was suspended from his law practice and was prohibited from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two years after a finding that he notarized consultancy service contracts between a certain local government and persons who are already deceased. In this case, the lawyer’s argument that his signatures in the said contracts were a forgery did not convince the Supreme Court. The lawyer showed the wide disparity between such signatures in the consultancy service contracts and the specimen signature he submitted to the Notarial Section of Manila Regional Trial Court but such was not enough.

The Supreme Court noted the striking dissimilarity between the signature appearing on the consultancy service contract and the specimen signature he submitted to the Notarial Section. Further, the high court noted that the consultancy service contract was not among the notarized document submitted to the Notarial Section by the lawyer as a Notary Public. Nonetheless, the consultancy services contract which the lawyer claims he did not notarize bore his notarial seal. Thus he could not be exculpated because he failed to safeguard his notarial seal. Let’s read the Supreme Court’s decision:

“The act of notarization is not an ordinary routine but is imbued with substantive public interest. A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Thus, a notary public should observe utmost care in performing his duties to preserve public confidence in the integrity of notarized documents.

A notarial seal is a mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary public has officially signed it. Section 2, Rule VII of the 2004 Notarial Rules states that every notary public shall have his own notarial seal, which shall have the name of the city or province and the word “Philippines,” and his own name on the margin and the roll of attorney’s number on its face. The said seal shall only be possessed by the notary public, to wit:

Section 2. Official Seal. – (a) Every person commissioned as notary public shall have a seal of office, to be procured at his own expense, which shall not be possessed or owned by any other person. It shall be of metal, circular in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall have the name of the city or province and the word “Philippines” and his own name on the margin and the roll of attorney’s number on the face thereof, with the words “notary public” across the center. A mark, image or impression of such seal shall be made directly on the paper or parchment on which the writing appears.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Further, the 2004 Notarial Rules is explicit on the duties and obligations of the notary public, which include the duty to secure and safeguard his notarial seal so that no unauthorized persons can have access thereto, viz.:

Section 2. Official Seal.- x x x

x x x x

(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and secure and shall be accessible only to the notary public or the person duly authorized by him.

x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)

“In this case, Atty. X denied having authored or notarized the consultancy contracts and claimed that his signatures therein as notary public were forged. Although the IBP observed that Atty. X’s signatures in the subject contracts were strikingly dissimilar to his specimen signatures on file before the Notarial Section of the RTC, and while it may likewise be true that said contracts were not included in the notarial reports he submitted thereto, he cannot claim full deniability and be exculpated from administrative liability because the contracts bore his notarial seal.

“Instead of offering any plausible explanation as to how the Consultancy contracts came to be stamped with his notarial seal, Atty. X merely insisted that he never notarized nor authored said contracts, that his signatures therein were forgeries, and that said contracts were not included in his notarial reports.”

June 25, 2025
Non-Regularization of Probationary Employee
July 22, 2022

Probationary employee enjoys security of tenure. Their employment cannot be terminated on employer’s bare claim that the employee failed to qualify. There are some procedures and parameters that must be considered.

Employers often have mistaken assumption that when they hire an employee on a probationary status such employee may be terminated at will at the end of the probationary period. It must be noted that probationary employees also enjoy security of tenure. Although, the rule in terminating their employment is slightly different as it does not require the application of a two-notice rule, non-regularization of a probationary employee cannot be arbitrarily exercised by the employer.

In a little old case of Abbott Laboratories, Philippines, et. al. vs. Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz,[1] the Supreme Court laid down some guidelines about a probationary employee.
1. A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.
1. The services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
1. It should be noted however that Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides that if the employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the reasonable standards upon which the regularization would be based on at the time of the engagement, then the said employee shall be deemed a regular employee. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.
1. The employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when dealing with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second, the employer must make such communication at the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. If the employer fails to comply with either, the employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee.
1. Keeping with these rules, an employer is deemed to have made known the standards that would qualify a probationary employee to be a regular employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what he is expected to do or accomplish during the trial period of probation. This goes without saying that the employee is sufficiently made aware of his probationary status as well as the length of time of the probation. The exception to this is when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers.
1. The rule on notifying a probationary employee of the standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an employee who acts in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard to which there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met.
1. In the same light, an employee’s failure to perform the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s non-regularization.
A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee; the usual two-notice rule does not govern. Employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.

Legal Reference

[1] G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013
June 25, 2025
State Auditors

August 23, 2021

Publication of Commission on Audit’s findings on DOH is a test to its people’s character.

The Commission on Audit (“COA”) is a constitutionally-mandated agency of the government to check government agencies’ spending and use of its funds. Any government that advocates good governance and fights graft and corruption should be glad that COA is publishing and showing to the public, through its website, their findings or suspicions of anomaly in any government agency. It is odd reaction however to have angst against the agency which has the same advocacy as that of a government who bows to fight corruption especially if such agency is performing its constitutionally-mandated functions.

In this light, the Department of Health (“DOH”) Secretary’s damning reaction to the publication by COA of its audit findings on DOH’s way of spending its funds is outrageous to the people. Instead of saying that COA destroyed its reputation to the public, it would have been better had he and his team just offered an explanation or pointed out COA’s errors in its findings. There is no need for a tantrum. It will only validate the propriety of the advice for him to seek psychiatric help.

COA’s functions are very clear under Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. It states thus:

“SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.

“(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.

“SECTION 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.”

Not even a law can be passed to exempt any government agency. So, why quarrel with the state auditor? It is the guardian of government treasury and public’s money. Its findings should be appropriately responded and not met with threats. If judicial tribunals are regarded as protector of people’s rights, we should view COA as the guardian of the people’s money. We should welcome the publication of its audit findings. It is in accordance with the transparency mandate and the people have right to know. If the audited agency has acceptable and proper explanations, then the public should also welcome it. If there is a cause that can stand to prosecute responsible officials and employees for graft and corruption, then it should be filed and pursued valiantly without fear of any backlash. The Philippines needs genuine change. Its people and government must start such change.

June 25, 2025
Fraudulent Concealment of Pregnancy as a Ground for Annulment of Marriage?

November 15, 2024

This is the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Villacorta, G.R. No. 249953 June 23, 2021

FACTS

In April of 2001, Melvin learned that Janufi was pregnant. Melvin was “surprised” and “doubtful” to learn Janufi was already one month pregnant because they had sexual intercourse only in March of 2001. Although Melvin doubted the paternity of the child, Janufi supposedly assured him that he was the only person she had sexual intercourse with. This put his doubts to rest. On December 1, 2001, Janufi gave birth to a baby girl named Mejan Dia and she and Melvin then began living together. After almost three years or on August 14, 2004, Melvin and Janufi finally got married. When the couple quarreled Melvin had the DNA test of the Mejan Dia. The DNA test result showed that there is a 00.00% probability that Mejan Dia is daughter of Melvin.

Melvin seeks annulment of their marriage on the ground of fraud alleging concealment of pregnancy.

“The Republic argues that the RTC decision annulling the marriage is not in accord with law and jurisprudence because the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage may be annulled on the basis of fraud through concealment only if “x x x at the time of the marriage, the wife was pregnant and she concealed the fact that such pregnancy was by a man other than her husband.” In the case at bar, Mejan Dia was already almost three years old when Melvin and Janufi got married on August 4, 2004. Evidently, Janufi was not pregnant at the time of her marriage and Article 46(2) cannot apply. Further, the OSG claims that it is clear from Janufi’s messages that she had no intention to deceive Melvin into acknowledging the paternity of Mejan Dia. While Janufi may have misrepresented the state of her chastity, it cannot be discounted that she honestly believed that Mejan Dia was sired by Melvin. The Court agrees.

“…. . . . . In this regard, the Family Code provides:

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(I) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (Underscoring supplied)

As opined by CA Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, a member of the Civil Code Revision and Family Law Committee, “[a]lthough fraud to vitiate consent has been defined by the Civil Code as insidious words and machinations which lead a party to enter into a contract without which he would not have entered into, this general definition of fraud in the Civil Code is not absolutely applicable to marriage since the subsequent article of the Code (referring to Article 86 of the Civil Code) limits the kinds of fraud which will serve as grounds for annulment. Consequently, in order to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud, the fraud must consist of one of those enumerated in Article 86.” Article 86 of the Civil Code is the precursor of Article 46 of the Family Code, which now states:

Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant bv a man other than her husband;

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

“Based on the foregoing, it is evident that to constitute fraud that warrants annulment under Article 46(2): I) the wife must have been pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the marriage and 2) the wife must have fraudulently concealed the same.

“In this regard, the OSG correctly argues that the concealed pregnancy, which vitiates consent, must have existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Eduardo Caguioa explains that “[t]he essence of the fraud in this case is the non-disclosure of the present pregnancy of the wife x x x the pregnancy must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, thus, if the wife had previous relations with other men and as a consequence of which she became pregnant or bore a child previously, the concealment thereof will not be a ground for annulling the marriage if at the time the marriage was celebrated the wife was not pregnant.” It is the concealment of the fact of pregnancy by another man at the time of marriage that constitutes fraud as a ground for annulment. “No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

“In the instant case, the facts readily reveal that Mejan Dia was already almost three years old when Melvin and Janufi got married on August 4, 2004. As Janufi was not pregnant at the time of the marriage, any purported fraud she may have committed to induce Melvin to marry her cannot be considered the fraudulent concealment contemplated under Article 46(2). Indeed, the Court has held that not all fraudulent acts can be invoked to annul a marriage. The circumstances of fraud under Article 45(3) are exclusive and restrictive. In Anaya v. Palaroan, the Court resolved the question of whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman was a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 of the Civil Code. Speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court held that:

The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with “fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article,” and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, nondisclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: “No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.”

Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to [x x x] chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society. and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker’s intent being plain, the Court’s duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

June 25, 2025
Reckless Driving or Intentional Hit and Run (Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt)

Before the surrender of the person who, by himself and by his parents, appeared to have represented that he was the driver of the SUV that ran over the security guard I was contemplating about how the prosecution could prove the identity of the suspect in the frustrated murder charge the police filed with the prosecutor. It must be noted that the suspect was not caught after he fled the crime scene. Nobody pinpointed to a specific person who was driving that SUV. All that the police had, in so far as the identity of the driver is concerned, was the name of the registered owner of the SUV. His name (the real perpetrator), I believe, was not known to the authorities until his surrender. He gave statement before the media (upon police presentation) essentially admitting that he was the driver of the SUV when it ran over the security guard. Were it not for his surrender, the prosecutor would be facing a real uphill battle to prove his guilt. I was even thinking that his failure to come out in the open after the incident was his defense counsel’s legal strategy. I can only guess the reason why he changed his position and instead openly admitted that he was driving the SUV when it ran over the security guard. They may have sensed that the victim was already willing to settle and there is no use for hiding.

Everybody knows that to be convicted of murder or frustrated murder, the degree of proof must be beyond reasonable doubt. So, what is proof beyond reasonable doubt? It is defined under Section 2 Rule 133 of the Rules of Evidence as “[M]oral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.” It is stated under the same rule that “in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. It is the quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime.[1]

The elements of any offense are embodied in the definition of a crime (as defined by law). The elements of murder are as follows:
(a) that a person was killed;
(b) that the accused killed him;
(c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and
(d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In this case, even the presence of all the elements of frustrated murder may not be easily proved by the prosecution. But the prosecution will definitely be facing so much difficulty in proving the fact that the person they charged was the perpetrator of the crime (or the identity of the perpetrator). The most possible suspect could be the registered owner, and were it not for the admission the registered owner of the SUV would have been the respondent in the case. Nonetheless, there is still doubt as to the identity of the accused when there was no positive identification and it can pave the way for acquittal.

In the case of Franco vs. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court citing another case[2] stated that positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.

According to the Supreme Court, there are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This type of identification constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where a witness did not actually see the crime being committed but can still positively identify the suspect. For example, the suspect may have been the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This second type of positive identification forms part of circumstantial evidence. When taken together with other pieces of evidence that form an unbroken chain, such identification can lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion: that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.

In this case, the most likely suspect who would fall under the second definition of positive identification is the registered owner of the SUV. With the surrender of the real culprit, the identity of the suspect becomes much more established. However, the prosecution may still need some corroborating evidence to solidify the case. It is unclear whether the person who claimed to be driving the SUV at the time of the incident is also the registered owner of the vehicle. But even if he is, that fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was behind the wheel when the crime occurred. If the only basis for identifying the suspect had been the vehicle registration, reasonable doubt could have come into play—and possibly led to an acquittal.

Legal Resources

[1] Franco vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191185, February 1, 2016

[2] People vs. Pondivida

June 23, 2025