Category: Client Education

Simplifies complex legal concepts for everyday readers. Includes FAQs, how-to articles, and legal definitions.

  • Registering Real Property under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of PD 1529

    Registering Real Property under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of PD 1529

    PD 1529 registration under Section 14

    October 1, 2021

    What are the parameters in evaluating the application for registration of real property under the framework of Sections 14(1) and 14(2)?

    Several parcel of lands, especially in the provinces, are not yet registered under the Torrens System though occupied and tilled by certain persons claiming ownership thereof. These parcels are untitled and the purported owners would only present a tax declaration in their names or in the names of their predecessors-in-interest when ask to prove ownership. Buyers of untitled lands would primarily ask for a Tax Declaration of the property and after sale rushes to transfer the same to their names. Tax Declaration however, as a general rule, is merely an evidence of possession but not ownership. It is thus advisable to have the real property titled once bought.

    Section 14, PD 1529 enumerates the valid grounds for registration of title to land, viz.:

    Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

    (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

    (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

    (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

    (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

    The Supreme Court in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., rep. by its Executive Vice-President and Gen. Manager, MR. RICHARD ALBERT I. OSMOND, G.R. No. 248306 July 28, 2021 distinguished the difference between registration under Section 14(1) and registration under Section 14(2) of PD 1529. It discussed how an application for registration of land should be evaluated under these two frameworks under Section 14 of PD 1529. Thus it stated that:

    Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines aptly drew the distinctions between the first and the second grounds, thus:

    “(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

    “(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

    “(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

    “(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the properly has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

    “(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

    “(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (emphases and underscoring added)

    “In fine, an applicant invoking Section 14(1) of PD 1529 needs to prove the following elements: (a) the property forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain at the time of the filing of the application for registration; (b) it has been, by itself or through its predecessors-in-interest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the property; and (c) the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

    “On the other hand, an application for registration based on Section14(2) of PD 1529 must establish the following requisites: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.”

  • Guidelines on Taxes of Separation Benefits

    Guidelines on Taxes of Separation Benefits

    A Filipina advisor explains separation benefit tax rates to a concerned Filipino couple in an office.

    July 26, 2022

    BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular Nos. 66-26 and 26-2011 provides guidelines in the tax treatment of Separation Benefits received by officials and employees on account of their separation from employment due to death, sickness or other physical disability and the issuance of Certificate of Tax Exemption from income tax and from the withholding tax.

    1. Revenue Memorandum Order No. 66-2016

    2. Revenue Memorandum Order No. 26-2011

  • Definitions of Various Bureau of Internal Revenue Issuances

    Definitions of Various Bureau of Internal Revenue Issuances

    Document showing Bureau of Internal Revenue Issuances for tax compliance.

    Understanding the different Bureau of Internal Revenue Issuances is essential for taxpayers, legal professionals, and businesses to ensure proper compliance with Philippine tax laws. This guide outlines the official definitions and purposes of each issuance as recognized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

    Types of Bureau of Internal Revenue Issuances

    Official Bureau of Internal Revenue Issuances published on the BIR website.

    Revenue Regulations (RRs) are issuances signed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, that specify, prescribe or define rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and related statutes.

    Revenue Memorandum Orders (RMOs) are issuances that provide directives or instructions; prescribe guidelines; and outline processes, operations, activities, workflows, methods and procedures necessary in the implementation of stated policies, goals, objectives, plans and programs of the Bureau in all areas of operations, except auditing.

    Revenue Memorandum Circulars (RMCs) are issuances that publish pertinent and applicable portions, as well as amplifications, of laws, rules, regulations and precedents issued by the BIR and other agencies/offices.

    Revenue Administrative Orders (RAOs) are issuances that cover subject matters dealing strictly with the permanent administrative set-up of the Bureau, more specifically, the organizational structure, statements of functions and/or responsibilities of BIR offices, definitions and delegations of authority, staffing and personnel requirements and standards of performance.

    Revenue Delegation of Authority Orders (RDAOs) refer to functions delegated by the Commissioner to revenue officials in accordance with law.

    Legal Reference

    Bureau of Internal Revenue

  • Requisites of Valid Retrenchment

    Requisites of Valid Retrenchment

    Legal conditions for valid retrenchment under Philippine labor law.

    July 26, 2022

    “What is Retrenchment? Retrenchment or downsizing is a mode of terminating employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee and without prejudice to the latter, resorted to by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls over shortage of materials. It is a reduction in manpower, a measure utilized by an employer to minimize business losses incurred in the operation of its business.

    x x x . . . .

    “Accordingly, the employer may resort to retrenchment in order to avert serious business losses. To justify such retrenchment, the following conditions must be present, namely:

    1. The retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses;
    2. The losses, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or, if only expected, are reasonably imminent;
    3. The expected or actual losses must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence;
    4. The retrenchment must be in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and
    5. There must be fair and reasonable criteria m ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.”

    Please see the case of FASAP VS. PAL G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018.

  • What is a Drug Den Within the Meaning of RA 9165 as Amended?

    What is a Drug Den Within the Meaning of RA 9165 as Amended?

    March 4, 2022

    what is a drug den under RA 9165

    A place where people are caught sniffing “shabu” or using illegal drugs does not automatically make that residence or place a drug den and that the person in charge of the same is guilty for maintaining a drug den as defined and punished under RA 9165.
    In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Andanar and Garbo, G.R. No. 246284, June 16, 2021, the Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning of a drug den as follows:

    For Garbo’s part, she was charged with illegal maintenance of a drug den under Section 6 of RA 9165. The offense requires the following elements: a) that the place is a den – a place where any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical is administered, delivered, stored for illegal purposes, distributed, sold, or used in any form; and b) that the accused maintains the said place.

    It is not enough that dangerous drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in the place. More than a finding that the dangerous drug is being used there, it must also be clearly shown that the accused is the maintainer or operator or the owner of the place where the dangerous drug is used or sold.

    First, a drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence may be proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers.

    People v. Galicia ordained that the prosecution must establish that the alleged drug den is a place where dangerous drugs are regularly sold to and/or used by customers of the maintainer of the den. The word “regular” means doing the same thing in uniform intervals, or something that is a common occurrence.

    Here, PO2 Antillon, Jr. testified that Garbo invited him inside her house where the sale of illegal drugs between him and Andanar took place. Thereafter, Garbo offered PO2 Antillon, Jr. that he could already use the drug he just bought for an additional fee of P20.00. If at all, this only proves an isolated illegal drug transaction involving SPO2 Antillon, Jr., Andanar, and Garbo. There was nothing on record, however, showing that Garbo’s house was frequently used as a drug den. Neither did the prosecution prove that Garbo’s house had a general reputation as such. Surely, the prosecution had only presented a singular occurrence of the so-called illegal drug activity in Garbo’s house. The same does not satisfy the requirement in Galicia. Garbo, therefore, cannot be considered a maintainer of drug den. Besides, the supposed corpus delicti was not even established in view of the clear violation of the chain of custody rule, compromising its integrity.

    Second, SPO2 Antillon, Jr. testified that while inside Garbo’s house, he saw Gutierrez using shabu, thus, making Garbo’s house a drug den.

    We disagree. At the moment SPO2 Antillon, Jr. saw Gutierrez allegedly sniffing something, he only assumed it was shabu. More, nothing in the records show that Gutierrez underwent a laboratory examination and was found positive for drug use. Thus, the Court will not convict an accused, sans any supporting evidence. Mere assumptions or conjectures cannot substitute the required quantum of evidence in criminal prosecution. In any case, a single isolated occasion where one sees another person sniffing shabu inside a residence, even if true, does not automatically convert that residence into a den. The element of regularity is conspicuously absent.

  • Actions for Recovery of Possession of Real Property

    Actions for Recovery of Possession of Real Property

    August 8, 2022

    Legal recovery remedies for real property under Philippine law.

    These are the three ways to recover possession of real property under the Philippine law and legal system

    The legal actions for recovery of possession of real property may be any of the following:

    1. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahucio). In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth, whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession, while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

    The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

    2. Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.

    3. Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and awards the possession of the property to the lawful owner. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.[1]

    On the other hand, we have the so-called action for Quieting of Title, which is a “common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.” In such an action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants to place things in their proper place and to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (b) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

    The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.” [2]

    [1] You may read the case of Heirs of Alfonso Yusingco, Represented by Teodoro K. Yusingco vs. Amelita Busilak, et.al., G.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018
    [2] Heirs of Margarita Prodon vs. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, G.R. No. 170604, September 02, 2013

  • Collusion and Grave Misconduct by Public Officers and Employees

    Collusion and Grave Misconduct by Public Officers and Employees

    October 1, 2021

    Collusion and Grave Misconduct in Philippine administrative law involving public officials.

    Grave misconduct committed by a public officer that will warrant his/her dismissal from the service must not be a mere failure to comply with the law. Also, an allegation of collusion must be proved by clear and convincing evidence to justify removal of a public officer from service.

    Legal standards for proving Collusion and Grave Misconduct among government employees.

    The case of Jaspe, Noel T. and Araneta, Ma. Negenia vs. Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office and Agustin Sonza G.R. No. 251940, July 12, 2021 grave misconduct that may warrant dismissal of a public officer was defined as follows:

    Grave misconduct is defined as the “wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.” It is not mere failure to comply with the law. Failure to comply must be deliberate and must be done in order to secure benefits for the offender or for some other person.”

    “For a charge of grave misconduct or any grave offense to prosper, therefore, the evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge. Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions, as in this case, warrants the dismissal of the charge.”

    Likewise in the same case, it was pronounced that to warrant a dismissal of a public officer or employee from the service based on collusion with parties in a public bidding, the person charging collusion must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that:

    “On this score, Desierto v. Ocampo pronounced that the complainant charging collusion must prove it by clear-and convincing evidence, thus:

    “Collusion implies a secret understanding whereby one party plays into another’s hands for fraudulent purposes. It may take place between and every contractor resulting in no competition, in which case, the government may declare a failure of bidding. Collusion may also ensue between contractors and the chairman and members of the PBAC to simulate or rig the bidding process, thus insuring the award to a favored bidder, to the-prejudice of the government agency and public service. For such acts of the chairman and the members of the PBAC, they may be held administratively liable for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the government service. Collusion by and among the members of the PBAC and/or contractors submitting their bids may be determined from their collective acts or omissions before, during and after the bidding process. The complainants are burdened to prove such collusion by clear and convincing evidence because if so proved, the responsible officials may be dismissed from the government service or meted severe administrative sanctions for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the government service.”

    Further, Desierto ordained that mere declaration of a lone winning bidder does not necessarily mean there was collusion, absent a showing that the BAC members were closely associated with the bidders, thus:

    “We believe that in this case, the complainants failed to prove that there was collusion by and among the contractors and the chairman and members of the PBAC. The PBAC may have erred in waiving the defects in the bids of Carwin Construction and Ed-Mar’s Construction on the belief that the defects were minor, but it does not follow that its members, including the respondent, conspired with the contractors to rig the bid process. Carwin Construction and Ed-Mar’s Construction may have, likewise, submitted defective bid documents but, absent any other evidence, it cannot thereby be concluded that there was conspiracy to rig the bid process to insure that PR T Construction would emerge the lone and winning bidder. The chairman and members of the PBAC may have, likewise, erred in the performance of their duties, but it does not necessarily mean that they did so in bad faith or with dishonesty.”

  • Other Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage

    Other Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage

    Other Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage in Philippine Family Law.

    Psychological incapacity is actually the most difficult to prove as a ground in petitions for annulment of marriage. Although most difficult, this is most frequently use by lawyers and petitioners. Probably, the petitioner just want to get out of the marriage although he/she has no grounds at all, and because there is no divorce in the Philippines, they have no other alternative but utilize psychological incapacity.

    Because there is no divorce in the Philippines, lawyers of couples (husbands or wives) who want to end their marriages frequently use Article 36 of the Family Code in seeking annulment of marriage. This is the provision on psychological incapacity. This ground for annulment of marriage is the most difficult ground to prove. If the lawyer in the Office of the Solicitor General who is assigned to the case relentlessly pursues the case up to the Supreme Court, it is more likely that a petition for annulment of marriages will be denied. The statistics of annulment cases grounded on psychological incapacity and decided by the Supreme Court would tell us that almost always the Supreme Court upheld the preservation of marriage. Psychological incapacity is very difficult to prove (especially when a case reaches the Supreme Court) considering that the law has no definite definition as to what psychological incapacity is. The entire Family Code did not even set parameters which may guide lawyers and parties as to the existence of psychological incapacity on the part of either spouse.

    There is only a jurisprudence to consult to guide lawyers in deciding whether psychological incapacity exists and that his/her client has a cause of action. Here is one jurisprudential definition of psychological incapacity in the case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 quoting another case:

    Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.

    It what further stated in that case that, “psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision “with less specificity than expected” in order to have the law “allow some resiliency in its application. Illustrative of the “less specificity than expected” has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.

    The Family Code provides other grounds for dissolution of marriage. If these grounds exist and supported by evidence, not just testimonial, the marriage will almost certainly be decreed annulled.

    Legal overview of Other Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage.

    Under Article 35 of the Family Code, the following marriages shall be void from the very beginning:

    1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
    2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
    3. Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by preceding Chapter (referring to Articles 27 to 34 of the Family Code);
    4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages under Article 41;
    5. Those contracted through mistake of one of the contracting party as to the identity of the other; and,
    6. Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

    Under Article 37 of the Family Code, the following marriages are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

    1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;
    2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

    Under Article 38 of the Family code the following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

    1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
    2. Between step-parents and step-children;
    3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
    4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
    5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
    6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
    7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
    8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
    9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.

    Under Article 41 of the Family Code the marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had the well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.

    Article 45 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be annulled for the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

    1. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty one, and the marriage was solemnized without consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
    2. That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
    3. That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
    4. That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or cease, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
    5. That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
    6. That either party was afflicted with sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.

    Legal References

    Executive Order No. 209, s. 1987 (Family Code of the Philippines)

    G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

  • Taxes on Sale of Shares of Stock

    Taxes on Sale of Shares of Stock

    July 26, 2022

    Taxpayers discussing stock sale tax rules

    BIR rules and regulations on taxes for sale of shares of stock

    Relevant BIR rules and regulations relevant to taxes impose on the transfer or sale of corporation’s shares traded or not traded thru local stock exchange.

    1. Revenue Regulation 6-2008

    2. Revenue Memorandum Circular 37-2012

    3. Revenue Regulation 6-2013

    4. Revenue Memorandum Order 15-2003

  • Notary Public’s Notarial Seal

    Notary Public’s Notarial Seal

    April 15, 2021

    Notary public reviewing documents with notarial seal on desk.

    A notary public should at, all times, safeguard his notarial seal. If somebody uses the notarial seal for any illegal act, the concerned notary public may be held administratively liable despite him/her having no knowledge of such illegal act.

    Legal evidence of misused notary public seal on fraudulent contract.

    In a very recent case, a lawyer was suspended from his law practice and was prohibited from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two years after a finding that he notarized consultancy service contracts between a certain local government and persons who are already deceased. In this case, the lawyer’s argument that his signatures in the said contracts were a forgery did not convince the Supreme Court. The lawyer showed the wide disparity between such signatures in the consultancy service contracts and the specimen signature he submitted to the Notarial Section of Manila Regional Trial Court but such was not enough.

    The Supreme Court noted the striking dissimilarity between the signature appearing on the consultancy service contract and the specimen signature he submitted to the Notarial Section. Further, the high court noted that the consultancy service contract was not among the notarized document submitted to the Notarial Section by the lawyer as a Notary Public. Nonetheless, the consultancy services contract which the lawyer claims he did not notarize bore his notarial seal. Thus he could not be exculpated because he failed to safeguard his notarial seal. Let’s read the Supreme Court’s decision:

    “The act of notarization is not an ordinary routine but is imbued with substantive public interest. A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Thus, a notary public should observe utmost care in performing his duties to preserve public confidence in the integrity of notarized documents.

    Official notarial seal design and notary public rules from the 2004 Notarial Rules.

    A notarial seal is a mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary public has officially signed it. Section 2, Rule VII of the 2004 Notarial Rules states that every notary public shall have his own notarial seal, which shall have the name of the city or province and the word “Philippines,” and his own name on the margin and the roll of attorney’s number on its face. The said seal shall only be possessed by the notary public, to wit:

    Section 2. Official Seal. – (a) Every person commissioned as notary public shall have a seal of office, to be procured at his own expense, which shall not be possessed or owned by any other person. It shall be of metal, circular in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall have the name of the city or province and the word “Philippines” and his own name on the margin and the roll of attorney’s number on the face thereof, with the words “notary public” across the center. A mark, image or impression of such seal shall be made directly on the paper or parchment on which the writing appears.

    x x x x (Emphases supplied)

    Further, the 2004 Notarial Rules is explicit on the duties and obligations of the notary public, which include the duty to secure and safeguard his notarial seal so that no unauthorized persons can have access thereto, viz.:

    Section 2. Official Seal.- x x x

    x x x x

    (c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and secure and shall be accessible only to the notary public or the person duly authorized by him.

    x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)

    “In this case, Atty. X denied having authored or notarized the consultancy contracts and claimed that his signatures therein as notary public were forged. Although the IBP observed that Atty. X’s signatures in the subject contracts were strikingly dissimilar to his specimen signatures on file before the Notarial Section of the RTC, and while it may likewise be true that said contracts were not included in the notarial reports he submitted thereto, he cannot claim full deniability and be exculpated from administrative liability because the contracts bore his notarial seal.

    “Instead of offering any plausible explanation as to how the Consultancy contracts came to be stamped with his notarial seal, Atty. X merely insisted that he never notarized nor authored said contracts, that his signatures therein were forgeries, and that said contracts were not included in his notarial reports.”