Atty. Ensign M. Icamen

Tag: Civil Code

  • Registering Real Property under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of PD 1529

    Registering Real Property under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of PD 1529

    PD 1529 registration under Section 14

    October 1, 2021

    What are the parameters in evaluating the application for registration of real property under the framework of Sections 14(1) and 14(2)?

    Several parcel of lands, especially in the provinces, are not yet registered under the Torrens System though occupied and tilled by certain persons claiming ownership thereof. These parcels are untitled and the purported owners would only present a tax declaration in their names or in the names of their predecessors-in-interest when ask to prove ownership. Buyers of untitled lands would primarily ask for a Tax Declaration of the property and after sale rushes to transfer the same to their names. Tax Declaration however, as a general rule, is merely an evidence of possession but not ownership. It is thus advisable to have the real property titled once bought.

    Section 14, PD 1529 enumerates the valid grounds for registration of title to land, viz.:

    Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

    (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

    (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

    (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

    (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

    The Supreme Court in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., rep. by its Executive Vice-President and Gen. Manager, MR. RICHARD ALBERT I. OSMOND, G.R. No. 248306 July 28, 2021 distinguished the difference between registration under Section 14(1) and registration under Section 14(2) of PD 1529. It discussed how an application for registration of land should be evaluated under these two frameworks under Section 14 of PD 1529. Thus it stated that:

    “Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines aptly drew the distinctions between the first and the second grounds, thus:

    “(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

    “(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

    “(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

    “(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the properly has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

    “(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

    “(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (emphases and underscoring added)

    “In fine, an applicant invoking Section 14(1) of PD 1529 needs to prove the following elements: (a) the property forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain at the time of the filing of the application for registration; (b) it has been, by itself or through its predecessors-in-interest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the property; and (c) the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

    “On the other hand, an application for registration based on Section14(2) of PD 1529 must establish the following requisites: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.”

  • Actions for Recovery of Possession of Real Property

    Actions for Recovery of Possession of Real Property

    August 8, 2022

    Legal recovery remedies for real property under Philippine law.

    These are the three ways to recover possession of real property under the Philippine law and legal system

    The legal actions for recovery of possession of real property may be any of the following:

    1. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahucio). In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth, whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession, while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

    The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

    2. Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.

    3. Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and awards the possession of the property to the lawful owner. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.[1]

    On the other hand, we have the so-called action for Quieting of Title, which is a “common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.” In such an action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants to place things in their proper place and to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (b) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

    “The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.” [2]

    [1] You may read the case of Heirs of Alfonso Yusingco, Represented by Teodoro K. Yusingco vs. Amelita Busilak, et.al., G.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018
    [2] Heirs of Margarita Prodon vs. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, G.R. No. 170604, September 02, 2013

  • Fraudulent Concealment of Pregnancy as a Ground for Annulment of Marriage?

    Fraudulent Concealment of Pregnancy as a Ground for Annulment of Marriage?

    November 15, 2024

    Man questioning paternity before marriage as basis for annulment.

    This is the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Villacorta, G.R. No. 249953 June 23, 2021

    FACTS

    In April of 2001, Melvin learned that Janufi was pregnant. Melvin was “surprised” and “doubtful” to learn Janufi was already one month pregnant because they had sexual intercourse only in March of 2001. Although Melvin doubted the paternity of the child, Janufi supposedly assured him that he was the only person she had sexual intercourse with. This put his doubts to rest. On December 1, 2001, Janufi gave birth to a baby girl named Mejan Dia and she and Melvin then began living together. After almost three years or on August 14, 2004, Melvin and Janufi finally got married. When the couple quarreled Melvin had the DNA test of the Mejan Dia. The DNA test result showed that there is a 00.00% probability that Mejan Dia is daughter of Melvin.

    Melvin seeks annulment of their marriage on the ground of fraud alleging concealment of pregnancy.

    Supreme Court interprets the legal grounds for annulment based on fraud.

    “The Republic argues that the RTC decision annulling the marriage is not in accord with law and jurisprudence because the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage may be annulled on the basis of fraud through concealment only if “x x x at the time of the marriage, the wife was pregnant and she concealed the fact that such pregnancy was by a man other than her husband.” In the case at bar, Mejan Dia was already almost three years old when Melvin and Janufi got married on August 4, 2004. Evidently, Janufi was not pregnant at the time of her marriage and Article 46(2) cannot apply. Further, the OSG claims that it is clear from Janufi’s messages that she had no intention to deceive Melvin into acknowledging the paternity of Mejan Dia. While Janufi may have misrepresented the state of her chastity, it cannot be discounted that she honestly believed that Mejan Dia was sired by Melvin. The Court agrees.

    “…. . . . . In this regard, the Family Code provides:

    Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

    (I) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

    (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

    (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

    (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

    (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

    (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (Underscoring supplied)

    As opined by CA Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, a member of the Civil Code Revision and Family Law Committee, “[a]lthough fraud to vitiate consent has been defined by the Civil Code as insidious words and machinations which lead a party to enter into a contract without which he would not have entered into, this general definition of fraud in the Civil Code is not absolutely applicable to marriage since the subsequent article of the Code (referring to Article 86 of the Civil Code) limits the kinds of fraud which will serve as grounds for annulment. Consequently, in order to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud, the fraud must consist of one of those enumerated in Article 86.”  Article 86 of the Civil Code is the precursor of Article 46 of the Family Code, which now states:

    Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:

    (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;

    (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant bv a man other than her husband;

    (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or

    (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

    No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

    Annulment denied due to absence of valid fraud under family law.

    “Based on the foregoing, it is evident that to constitute fraud that warrants annulment under Article 46(2): I) the wife must have been pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the marriage and 2) the wife must have fraudulently concealed the same.

    “In this regard, the OSG correctly argues that the concealed pregnancy, which vitiates consent, must have existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Eduardo Caguioa explains that “[t]he essence of the fraud in this case is the non-disclosure of the present pregnancy of the wife x x x the pregnancy must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, thus, if the wife had previous relations with other men and as a consequence of which she became pregnant or bore a child previously, the concealment thereof will not be a ground for annulling the marriage if at the time the marriage was celebrated the wife was not pregnant.” It is the concealment of the fact of pregnancy by another man at the time of marriage that constitutes fraud as a ground for annulment. “No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

    “In the instant case, the facts readily reveal that Mejan Dia was already almost three years old when Melvin and Janufi got married on August 4, 2004. As Janufi was not pregnant at the time of the marriage, any purported fraud she may have committed to induce Melvin to marry her cannot be considered the fraudulent concealment contemplated under Article 46(2). Indeed, the Court has held that not all fraudulent acts can be invoked to annul a marriage. The circumstances of fraud under Article 45(3) are exclusive and restrictive. In Anaya v. Palaroan, the Court resolved the question of whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman was a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 of the Civil Code. Speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court held that:

    The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with “fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article,” and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, nondisclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: “No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.”

    Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to [x x x] chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society. and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker’s intent being plain, the Court’s duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.